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FREE EXERCISE AND THE VALUES OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
by John H. Garvey*
One thing that has always bothered me about free exercise juris-
prudence is that it rests on values we have seldom tried to state, much
less justify. In a way this is not surprising. We have only recently aban-
doned the assumption, which may never have been true, that Ameri-
cans share a common understanding of language about God and tran-
scendent values. That understanding made it unnecessary to define for
nonspeakers a meaning that even believers have trouble putting into
words. But today we are probably not "a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being"-at least not if "religious" is sup-
posed to describe some common sentiment shared by members of our
society.
If we no longer think alike, it is time to start talking about why
religious liberty matters to some of us. This article is an effort to begin
the conversation. I will first look at how we have neglected the problem
of free exercise values, and consider some difficulties that arise in solv-
ing this problem. I will then show why the common arguments for pro-
tecting other kinds of civil liberties do not work very well here. Finally,
I will mention a few possible directions for further study; but these are
not paths I have gone down very far, and I know that there are others I
have ignored altogether.
I. THE NEGLECT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
The best way to illustrate the point that free exercise theory rests
on unstated and unjustified values is by comparison. Consider, for ex-
ample, the massive amount of work done during the last two decades to
explain why the Constitution does, or should, protect freedom of
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., University of Notre
Dame; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
speech. Even if one ignores Milton2 and Mill3 and begins in 1965 with
Meiklejohn, 4 it is difficult to count the treatises," books," and articles7
on the subject. These works have generated a number of more or less
convincing explanations for the source, scope, and strength of the right
to freedom of expression. They include a variety of utilitarian or conse-
quentialist claims: that speech is important to the process of self-gov-
ernment; that it promotes the discovery of truth; that it serves as a
safety valve for blowing off steam that would otherwise vent itself more
violently; and that attempts to suppress speech are counterproductive.
The authors of these works also reason that speech is intrinsically im-
portant because it is an integral mode of self-realization, because it is
tied in with personal choice and human dignity, and so on.
Another constitutional freedom that has occupied a large part of
the Supreme Court's time during the past decade is the substantive due
process liberty involved in decisions about procreation. Here the need
for justification has been obvious from the beginning, because there is
no textual or historical facade behind which one can hide in defending
2. See J. MILTON. AREOPAGITICA (E. Arber ed. 1868 & photo. reprint 1972).
3. See J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. V. Schields ed. 1956).
4. A. MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in POLITICAL FREE-
DOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1979).
5. See, e.g., T. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); M. NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1984). 1
6. See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER. THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); 2 J. FEINBERG. THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1985);
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (F. Berger ed. 1980); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY (1982).
7. Here are just a few of the good ones, that address not what the law is, but the reasons for
protecting freedom of speech: Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. Li. I (1971); Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
157 (1980); Fuchs, Further Steps Toward A General Theory Of Freedom of Expression, 18 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 347 (1976); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975); McCloskey, Liberty Of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits, 13 IN-
QUIRY 219 (1970); Morrow, Speech. Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235 (1975):
Munro, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits, 13 INQUIRY 238 (1970); Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-
Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978); Stone, Re-
strictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978); Tinder, Freedom of Expression: The Strange Imperative, 89 YALE
Li. 162 (1980); Van AIstyne, The M~bius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red
Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105
(1979).
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the principle of special protection that the Court has accepted. Once
again the list of commentators is long8 (though in this context some
have concluded that there is no justification for the right). Those who
have identified some value underlying the abortion and related deci-
sions focus mainly on intrinsic, rather than instrumental, justifications.
They trace the due process liberty to the value of individual autonomy,
which is central to self-realization or human dignity, or to a deeper
principle of equality suggested by the natural connection between social
control over procreation and sex discrimination.
By comparison with the wealth of theorizing about expression and
procreation, the foundational work done on the free exercise clause is
pretty meager. Some have addressed the nature and strength of free
exercise values obliquely. It is impossible to apply the religion clauses
without first defining the term "religion," and questions of justification
have come up in that context.9 But that is a different, though related,
problem, just as defining "speech" is different from explaining why the
Constitution should protect speech. A handful of writers have attacked
the question head-on,"' but they have left a lot to be said."
8. See. e.g., ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECrIvEs 211-59 (J. Garfield & P. Hcnnes-
sey eds. 1984); P. BOBBTT. CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 157-65 (1982); D. RicARi s. Sex. DRUGS,
DEATH AND THE LAW (1982); Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits.
Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U.L REv. 978 (1981); Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the
Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFFALO L REv. 107 (1982);
Craven; Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699; Dixon, The 'New'Substan-
tive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L REV. 43; Ely. The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973); Epstein. Substan-
tive Due Process by Any Other Name" The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159; Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L REV. 375
(1985); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLuN. L REV. 1410 (1974); Heymann & Barzelay,
The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics. 53 B.U.L REv. 765 (1973): Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624 (1980); Noonan, The Root and Branch of
Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668 (1984); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections
on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L REv. 417 (1976); Regan, Rewriting Rot v. Wade, 77
MicH. L. REv. 1569 (1979); Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221 (1973).
9. See. e.g., Choper, Defining "'Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L REV. 579;
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAUF. L REv. 753 (1984): Merl,
The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Reli-
gion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978); Note, Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the
D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1965).
10. See. e.g., Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L REV. 327, 336-44
(1969); Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution. 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 83; Sum-
mers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL L REv. 53 (1946).
11. Professor Mansfield recently hit the problem on the nose:
Reluctance to see that if interpretation of the Constitution generally requires the ex-
1986]
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The Supreme Court has not been much troubled by the issue.
When pressed to explain the preferred position of free exercise, the
Court has at times reasoned that it is "ordained in the light of his-
tory." 12 While that is undoubtedly true, it would be nice to have a more
convincing reason than that we have done things that way for a long
time. The Court's other approach has been to collapse free exercise
claims into free speech claims, a tactic that allows it to rely on the
well-developed structure of free speech values mentioned above. Some-
times the Court has simply submerged the free exercise issue alto-
gether, and treated the liberty interest as though it had no religious
aspect.13 At other times it has bracketed the two freedoms together to
make them functionally equivalent.1 4 The latter practice is so common
that it has led one commentator to conclude that free exercise has no
independent content-that all religious liberty claims can be solved as
free speech claims in disguise.15
This is an unhealthy state of affairs. We cannot have a vigorous
and consistent religious jurisprudence without some articulated notion
of the reasons for protecting religious freedom. Unlike other kinds of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, freedoms by their nature cannot
be absolute.1 6 The range of protected conduct is too broad, and the
circumstances in which claims can be asserted are too many, to allow
freedoms such strength. That may mean that some kinds of genuinely
religious claims should get less protection than others. It certainly
means that religious claims will sometimes be denied. But the language
pounding of a philosophy this is also true of the religion clauses, has limited recognition
of what the character of that philosophy may be, what the content of its ideas about
human nature and human destiny may be.
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 904 (1984).
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 622-29 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490-96 (1961); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878).
13. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
713-17 (1977); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 634 (1943) ("Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious
views .. "); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
14. See. e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
15. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L.
REv. 545 (1983).
16. Contrast the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial (criminal and
civil), and the immunity from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V-VIII.
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of the first amendment offers no clue about how to separate strong
from weak claims, or winners from losers. The strictest constructionist
would concede that the Supreme Court has to "explicate the meaning"
and define "the contours" even of expressly protected rights. And that
can be done only by relying on the values that underlie them.
II. OBSTACLES TO DEVISING A GENERAL THEORY
Though the need to identify free exercise values is clear, there are
reasons for doubting that it can be satisfied easily. A comparison with
free speech and substantive due process is again instructive.
Consider first the types of action covered by the free exercise
clause. The Supreme Court recognized early on that "the Amendment
embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act." 8 But
those two categories comprise every conceivable instance of human ac-
tion; everything is covered by the free exercise clause, provided it has a
religious motivation. The variety of recent cases demonstrates that this
is literally true. One's religious convictions can make a free exercise
question out of having a social security number,' paying social security
or unemployment tax,20 carrying a driver's license,21 having license
plates, 2 getting paid a minimum wage,23 going to school,24 running a
racially segregated school,25 or playing records.2 6 Some claims are suc-
cessful and some are not, but the Court has not been able to solve any
of these problems simply by saying that the clause does not apply.
The contrast of free exercise issues with free speech questions is
obvious. Justice Black, 7 Professor Emerson, 28 and others have stressed
that the free speech clause protects expression but not action. Having
17. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
18. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
19. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600 (M.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd sub noa. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.
Ct. 2147 (1986).
20. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
21. Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985), a~fg 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1983).
22. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
23. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
26. Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.
27. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes'" A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L Ray. 549
(1962). Contrast Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, in which Justice Black concurred, in Co-
hen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (public display of jacket
stating "Fuck the Draft" "was mainly conduct and little speech").
28. T. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 17.
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thus limited the scope of the amendment, they have then been able to
argue for nearly absolute protection of covered conduct. That distinc-
tion has proven difficult to maintain, and has solved fewer problems
than its proponents hoped. But it emphasizes a point that first amend-
ment theorists have not forgotten-that a persuasive justification for
free speech protection must be tied to the nature of the activity pro-
tected (speech). Professor Scanlon, for example, has argued that the
individual's status as a rational agent gives him the right to receive
information necessary for making choices.29 The value of this argument
is that it is "directed at speech, rather than at the entire range of in-
terests that might with some minimal plausibility be designated
'individual'." 3 0
Substantive due process freedom presents an even more impressive
contrast with free exercise. Although the general "liberty" protected by
the due process clause is fairly open-ended, 31 the Court has found a few
actions deserving of special protection. The only well-defined categories
are having an abortion,32 using contraceptives, 3 getting married, 4 and
having and raising children. 5 The Court has refused to broaden the
group to include other instances of doing what one wants with one's
own body,36 or even other instances of sexual conduct.87 This limitation
on substantive due process rights has generated controversy about the
appropriate underlying values.38 But it has at least made the task of
29. Scanlon, supra note 7, at 215-22.
30. F. SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 71. Professor Meiklejohn made a parallel claim for the
social value of speech on the basis of popular, rather than individual, sovereignty. A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4.
31. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) ("The liberty mentioned in that
amendment . . . is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
his faculties. ... ).
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
34. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The flip side of this right, getting unmarried,
may receive some of the same protection. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
35. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute providing for sterilization of "ha-
bitual criminals" voided .on equal protection grounds).
36. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (county regulation limiting the length of police-
men's hair found not to violate any 14th amendment right).
37. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 54 U.S.L.W. 4919 (U.S. June 30, 1986) (homosexuality)-
Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa.), afO'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (adultery).
38. Compare Judge Bork's opinion in Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1388 with Dworkin, Reagan's
Justice, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Nov. 8, 1984, at 27, col. 1; and Rees, Reagan's Justice: An Ex-
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explanation less complex, and has enabled the Court to offer more un-
qualified protection where it gives protection at all.
A second source of difficulty with formulating free exercise values,
apart from the infinite variety of protected acts, is that those acts vary
so greatly in their importance to the claimant. In almost all instances
the strong due process freedoms, such as procreation and marriage, are
matters of great consequence in the claimant's life. The same is not
true for the whole range of free exercise acts. Belief or conduct may be
commanded, recommended, rewarded, encouraged, desired, permitted,
discouraged, forbidden, or punished within a claimant's belief system.
It would be irrational for the law to ignore those differences in deciding
what social costs to tolerate in the interest of accommodation. My own
interest in certain kinds of religious observance (fasting or abstinence
from meat) may be less significant than my interest in others (worship
or marriage). In a case before the Court last term, Steven Roy testified
that, in his Native American religious tradition, having a social secur-
ity number was not as objectionable as the "widespread use of the so-
cial security number [by the federal or state governments] . . . in...
computer systems."39
This kind of variation also occurs in free speech cases, where it has
made theorizing more complex. One response has been to rank catego-
ries of speech by the importance of the values underlying them. Thus
political speech is "[a]t the core of the First Amendment"'" because it
"is intimately related to the process of governing"' 1 and "a major pur-
pose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs.' 42 Commercial speech is lower on the totem pole,'4 and
obscenity and libel are off it altogether."
change, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Feb. 14, 1985, at 38, col. 2.
39. Roy, 590 F. Supp. at 605. Cf. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 105 S. Ct. at 1963 ("Even if
* . .the associates' beliefs precluded them from accepting the statutory (minimum wagel. there is
nothing in the Act to prevent the associates from returning the amounts to the Founda-
tion...."); Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 n.12 ("[I]t would be possible for an Amish member, upon
qualifying for social security benefits, to receive and pass them along to an Amish fund having
parallel objectives. It is not for us to speculate whether this would ease or mitigate the perceived
sin of participation.").
40. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982).
41. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
42. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (quoting Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
43. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 &
n.22, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 3561 (1984) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Consumer Council, 425 US. 748 (1976)).
44. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
1986]
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But it would be difficult to make this approach, detailed though it
is, part of the jurisprudential structure for religious liberty. Although
religious acts (like speech acts) vary in significance, this significance
may be sect-specific or even private. The Court can confidently assert
that political speech has an unusually high value (or commercial speech
a not-so-high value) for all of us. It can make no such generalization
about worship of God," observance of the Sabbath," obedience to
scripture, 47 adherence to standards of religious dress, 48 and so on.
One important consequence of this is that religious observers have
to be allowed to set a value on their own claims that the government is
not in a position to test, except for sincerity.49 And that makes the
jurisprudential search for values seem rather hopeless: the free exercise
clause protects an infinite variety of acts; the acts themselves differ,
perhaps greatly, in importance; and decisions about assigning values to
different acts have to be made by a multitude of people, each in his or
her own individual case.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF ACCUSTOMED SOLUTIONS
I have a few suggestions about directions to explore in the develop-
ment of free exercise jurisprudence. Before taking them up, though, I
want to mention some that I think may be dead ends. These include the
kinds of values to which we have become most accustomed in our theo-
ries about other constitutional liberties.
A. The Constraining Influence of the Establishment Clause
The most striking feature of the free exercise clause is that it is
coupled with the first amendment's injunction against the establish-
ment of religion. Free speech and due process liberties have no such
250 (1952).
45. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.1 1 (1961) ("Among religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.").
46. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2929 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) ("The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special . . . protection without according
similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees.").
47. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) ("Intrafaith differences. . . are not
uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.").
48. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[Slome
Orthodox Jews who consider themselves devout do not feel obliged to cover their heads at all
times."), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
49. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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companions. Indeed, one of the most persistent justifications for pro-
tecting free speech is its role in promoting democratic self-govern-
ment,50 an independent end that the Constitution itself establishes.
One consequence of the establishment of democracy is that we al-
low the government to promote speech, or democracy itself, by entering
the market as a participant. The government can create public schools
and require children attending them to learn the virtues of democracy
and the evils of fascism. It can finance presidential election campaigns,
and in doing so give more money to Republicans and Democrats than
to Nazis.51
The Constitution does not promote any particular social or scien-
tific truth in the way it establishes a form of government, but we do see
the attainment of truth as a worthy social objective, and we value
speech because it serves that end. For that reason we allow the govern-
ment to act in some ways to increase the quality and variety of speech.
One example is rules allowing access to broadcast,0 2 and now cable, 3
media; others include the Corporation for Public Broadcasting," and
legislation like the Newspaper Preservation Act. 5 We even spend pub-
lic money to promote particular versions of truth: We teach evolution
but not creationism in our schools; the National Endowments for the
Arts and Humanities sponsor some kinds of art and literature but not
others.
In all of these examples the government acts as a participant in,
not a regulator of, the free speech market. We allow government par-
ticipation because it is consistent with the values we think underlie
freedom of speech. By forbidding the government to promote religion,
on the other hand, the Constitution indicates that free exercise rests on
a different set of values. We are very much hampered in arguing for
religious freedom on the basis of its social consequences. We cannot say
such things as that it promotes a religious society, or that it is an effec-
50. See supra note 4.
51. See. e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94-95 (1976) (challenge to public financing of
presidential election campaigns); Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses. 1981
Sup. CT. REv. 193, 215-16 & n.95 (discussing the Presidential Election campaign fund, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9002-9006 (1982)).
52. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
53. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2780-
86.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1982).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). See also Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 344 F.
Supp. 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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tive way of getting at the truth about religious issues.
The observation that free exercise cannot be supported by argu-
ments about its social consequences is not meant to deny that religion
affords a number of important social benefits. Religion has traditionally
solemnized the social order by prescribing moral norms. It has served
as a means for emotional expression and regulation. It has
sustained men in their commitments; reinforced their resolve
in struggle; justified their wars; explained misfortunes; pro-
vided a final court of appeal for disputes; sanctified specific
relationships and courses of action; and prescribed a variety of
reassuring techniques with which men could equip themselves
psychologically, whether in undertaking their day-to-day tasks
or in embarking upon a once-in-a-lifetime enterprise.5
But it is constitutionally a matter of indifference whether these pur-
poses are served by religion, or by law, science, psychiatry, popular cul-
ture, or some other agency. The Supreme Court made that fairly clear
in Stone v. Graham,57 where it forbade Kentucky to advertise "[t]he
secular application of the Ten Commandments . . . in . . .the funda-
mental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the
United States."58
B. Autonomy As A Value
As I indicated above, theories about the value of freedom of
speech have not been limited to the consequentialist variety. They have
also included strong arguments for the idea that speech is intrinsically
valuable. The most persistent of these is the quintessentially liberal
claim that speech is one important way in which we define ourselves as
autonomous actors, worthy of human dignity. In listening to the speech
of others, we learn the variety of ideas and principles from which we
can choose our own life's course. In speaking, we create our identity
and proclaim it to others.
Many have argued that the same value underlies the substantive
due process liberty that the Court has protected in Roe v. Wade and
56. B. WIlsON. RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 34 (1982).
57. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 41. See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (rejecting
the argument that school prayer should be permitted because it serves such "secular purposes [as)
the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the per-
petuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature").
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subsequent cases. The Eleventh Circuit recently concluded, regarding
homosexuality, that "[tihe Constitution prevents the States from un-
duly interfering in certain individual decisions critical to personal au-
tonomy."59 Professor Richards has gone even further, arguing that au-
tonomy as a value supports an individual liberty to engage in
prostitution. 0
In each of these instances, the autonomy justification rests on cer-
tain assumptions about the good of human life and the essential unity
of different civil liberties. "The vision [of the good], ultimately, is one
of persons who, because of the effective exercise of their autonomy, are
able to identify their lives as their own, having thus realized the inesti-
mable moral and human good of having chosen one's life as a free and
rational being."'" According to this view, the sources of value are the
ability to choose and the fact of choice-not the outcome of any partic-
ular choice. And all constitutional liberties, which provide protection
for different kinds of choices, 2 ultimately are sustained by that source
of value.
Given the contemporary acceptance of this thesis and its explana-
tory power, it is not surprising that some have attempted to apply it to
freedom of religion. Consider.this passage from a recent student note:
Through their choices to connect or to separate themselves,
individuals define their identities. The free exercise clause pro-
tects their choice of religious belief. For this protection to be
effective, a definition of religion for free exercise purposes
must emphasize religion's role in the formation of iden-
tity. . . In order to serve the free exercise clause's purpose
of protecting the individual's choice of his identity, religion
must be defined in terms of the formation of identity, not the
content of belief.6 3
There is some support for this view in what the Supreme Court has
done. In Torcaso v. Watkins," the Court held that Maryland had vio-
59. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 1985). reV'd. 54 U.S.LW. 4919
(U.S. June 30, 1986).
60. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the
Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L REv. 1195, 1224-28 (1979).
61. Id. at 1225-26 (footnote omitted).
62. See Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARv. L REv. 1756, 1757-58
(1981).
63. Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions
of the Self, 97 HARv. L REv. 1468, 1475 (1984).
64. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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lated the "freedom[s] of belief and religion" by requiring state office-
holders to declare their belief in God."5 So if the free exercise clause
protects the freedom not to believe as well as the freedom to be-
lieve-that is, if the outcome of one's religious choice is irrele-
vant-then one might naturally conclude that what the Constitution
values is the process of choice itself.
I nevertheless think it is wrong to say that the free exercise guar-
antee rests on the value of individual autonomy. That proposition is
misleading because it trades on several meanings of the word "free-
dom" to make it seem as though the activities protected by the Consti-
tution inevitably rest on values that we sometimes identify by cognate
terms. The Constitution guarantees what might be called "social free-
dom": It assures that, in certain specific areas of human endeavor (reli-
gion, speech, press, procreation, association), the government will not
coerce or restrain persons in the act of carrying out any of a number of
choices.0 6 I must, for example, be allowed to pray or blaspheme. But
the Constitution is not concerned with how I arrived at a particular
choice. I would still be entitled to free exercise protection if I went to
church only because my father threatened to disinherit me otherwise.
Indeed, the government itself may sometimes influence the choice I
make (for example, by offering me money),17 and yet not infringe upon
my constitutional freedom because it has not coerced or restrained me
from carrying out my choice.
One cannot say, then, that the Constitution protects the execution
of choices because it sees the process of making choices as intrinsically
valuable. The ability to make one's own choices is another kind of
"freedom," but there is no logical connection between that and social
freedom.
Self-determination, autonomy, acting rationally-these are
dispositional properties of individuals and may be taken as de-
fining conditions of. . . another concept of freedom: being a
65. Id. at 496.
66. I have taken the term "social freedom" and the term "free person," which I use below,
from F. OPPENHEIM, POLITICAL CONCEPTS: A RECONSTRUCTION, chs. 5 & 6 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as OPPENHEIM. POLITICAL CONCEPTS]. See also Oppenheim's earlier and more extensive
work, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM (1961) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM. DIMENSIONS OF FREE-
DOM]. "Social freedom" corresponds roughly to what Isaiah Berlin called "negative freedom." 1,
BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958).
67. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (states may refuse to subsidize abortions
under federal Medicaid program). The Establishment Clause prevents the government from wield-
ing such financial influence with respect to religious choices.
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free person. . . .This is the capacity a thoroughly conditioned
slave is likely to lack; but a slave who resists indoctrination
may well be, in this sense, a free person.68
Not only is there no logical connection between free exercise and
autonomy, there are real drawbacks to linking the two together. One
stems from what at first appears to be a great virtue of the autonomy
argument-its ability to offer a unified explanation for all constitu-
tional freedoms. The difficulty is that, by attempting to cover too many
activities, the argument offers too little protection. Consider the case of
Simcha Goldman. 9 He claimed that the free exercise clause protects
his right to wear a yarmulke while on duty at an Air Force hospital,
notwithstanding contrary Air Force regulations. Whatever one thinks
of the merits of Goldman's claim, no one would deny that it deserves
more serious consideration than I would get if I wanted to wear a cow-
boy hat under the same circumstances. 70
The autonomy argument, however, has a hard time telling these
two claims apart. I might truthfully say that wearing a cowboy hat is
important not just for my image, but to my very conception of self. If
my claim were sincere, Goldman and I ought to get the same degree of
protection for our autonomous choices. But Goldman's claim is consti-
tutionally stronger, for a reason that goes beyond autonomy to some
special value of religion. Both claims are protected, in a weak way, as
due process "liberties," but only Goldman's is explicitly mentioned in
the first amendment.71
A second problem with resting the free exercise guarantee on the
value of autonomy is that many religious claimants would not agree
with that explanation. The good envisioned by autonomy is choosing
one's own "life as a free and rational being. 1 72 But the religious claim-
ant often sees things the other way around: It is God who chooses him,
sometimes whether he likes it or not. Jews consider themselves the cho-
68. OPPENHEIM. POLITICAL CONCEPTS, supra note 66, at 93. See also Marcuse. Repressive
Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 86 (1969) ("Liberty is self-determination, auton-
omy-this is almost a tautology .. "); i. BERULN, supra note 66. at 16 ("The positive' sense of
the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.").
69. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
70. The Supreme Court denied Goldman's claim on the ground that the military's need for
dress uniformity, when applied reasonably and evenhandedly, outweighs Goldman's right to wear
traditional religious apparel. Id.
71. Professor Schauer has made a similar and powerful argument against deriving the right to
freedom of speech from broader principles of liberty. F. SCHAUER, supra note 6. ch. I.
72. Richards, supra note 60, at 1226.
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sen people. Many Christians believe the same of themselves.73 One
could try to finesse this difficulty by arguing that the religious claimant
is still autonomous if he assents rationally to the course of action he
sees God as having chosen for him. 4 But if asked why the Constitution
should protect his right to follow that course of action, his response
would undoubtedly be that God willed him to, not that he had autono-
mously agreed.
IV. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A THEORY OF VALUES
Having now made the situation seem altogether hopeless, I would
like to conclude by offering a few suggestions about values that might
deserve further exploration. I will discuss three in particular: avoiding
special suffering; avoiding conflicting duties; and avoiding the social
costs of nullification and civil disobedience.
A. Avoiding Special Suffering
One value that might underlie the free exercise clause is relief
from the special mental torment suffered by claimants who are forced,
through coercion or restraint, to violate religious norms. There is some-
thing very compelling about this in cases such as Reynolds v. United
States7 5 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,76 where the defendant in a criminal
action believes that he will face eternal damnation if he complies with
the law. The predicament may be especially painful even in less ex-
treme circumstances. The pain attendant upon compliance may be the
loss of a surpassingly desirable good, rather than actual punishment.71
73. Consider the description of Saul's conversion on the road to Damascus, Acts 9:3-9:20, or
the plea in St. Luke's gospel-"not my will, [Lord,] but thine," Luke 22:42. Cf. Chopcr, supra
note 9, at 601 ("many find in the teachings of ... Saint Augustine and John Calvin [the precept]
that salvation is the gift of God to His chosen, and is not to be earned by such behavior as good
works during life.").
74. See Richards, Rights and Autonomy, 92 ETHics 3, 11-12 (1981). Cf. OPPENIIEIM, POLITI-
CAL CONCEPTS, supra note 66, at 94 ("[c]ompliance with governmental enactments one considers
legitimate is comparable with autonomy and 'positive freedom.' ").
75. 98 U.S. at 161 ("the accused . . . proved that . . . 'failing or refusing to practise polyg-
amy by such male members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished,
and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.' ").
76. 406 U.S. at 209 (the Old Order Amish "believed that by sending their children to high
school, they would . . . endanger their own salvation and that of their children."). Cf. Barnette,
319 U.S. at 644 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) ("Neither our domestic tranquillity in peace
nor our martial effort in war depend on compelling little children to participate in a ceremony
which ends in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual condemnation.").
77. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971). See also Roy, 590 F. Supp, at 604
("Roy sincerely believes that the government's use of the social security number established for
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This hedonistic principle takes account of the believer's present
suffering, rather than of the loss that he suffers in contemplating. 8 By
making the relevant good the avoidance of pain, this principle skirts at
least one of the faults of the autonomy approach: It is consistent with
the fact that religious claimants may not see themselves as "choosing"
the commitments they fear to violate. The loss of bliss and the pangs of
hell are no less awful to contemplate for one who is made to play the
game than for one who opts in.
But hedonism pure and simple may share the other fault of the
autonomy approach: It may not provide any way of distinguishing
Simcha Goldman from the man in the cowboy hat. The question is
whether one can say that the suffering from deprivation of religious
liberty is somehow special. There are at least two sources of difficulty
in proving that proposition. One is that compliance with the law may
entail great emotional strain for reasons unrelated to religion. A soldier
drafted overseas to risk his life in combat may suffer greatly at the
thought of leaving his wife and children. The other source of difficulty
is the great variation in the significance of religious acts, of which I
spoke earlier.7 9 Not everything protected by the first amendment is re-
ligiously required on pain of severe loss; one who believes that saluting
the flag is simply disrespectful, not blasphemous, is also entitled to be
excused.
Dean Choper has suggested that we can correct this fault in the
special-suffering principle by taking account of the cause of suffering,
not just the emotion itself. He argues that the religious claimant's pain
is special because it derives from extratemporal consequences, not from
the kind of temporal disabilities suffered by the man in the cowboy hat
and the unbelieving soldier.80 This is a nice way to complete the hedon-
istic argument, because it provides an explanation for the uniqueness of
religious liberty. The problem with Choper's suggestion, however, is
that it threatens to remove coverage from a fairly broad range of cases
Little Bird of the Snow will 'rob the spirit' of Little Bird of the Snow .... ); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Pennsylvania has passed a law which
compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. That is
a cruel choice."). Several commentators have noted the role that this torment plays in the Court's
thinking about the free exercise clause. Choper, supra note 9, at 597-601; Clark. supra note II, at
337-38; Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause" A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE LJ. 350. 357 (1980).
78. The latter value, after all, is one that the Constitution could hardly enshrine next to the
establishment clause. And such losses could not be measured in any objective way.
79. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
80. Choper, supra note 9, at 597-601.
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that most of us think should get first amendment protection. To begin
with, it might not apply to many matters of worship whose abandon-
ment, though seen as undesirable, would not be visited with "damna-
tion or some like consequence."81 And it is even troublesome as applied
to matters of moral behavior: "A strict Calvinist, for example, might
think that election to heaven is determined on some basis beyond
human comprehension. . . . Many Christians are deeply unsure about
the precise relation of sins in this life to the nature of existence in a
possible afterlife. '82
I don't mean to say that we should abandon either the hedonistic
value or the extratemporal consequences modification. It may be a mis-
take for lawyers to assume, like physicists who seek to unify the four
forces, that there is only one ultimate principle supporting constitu-
tional freedoms. There may instead be a cluster of values, and this is
one that explains much of the importance we attach to free exercise.
B. Avoiding Conflicting Duties
This second value is not entirely distinct from the first. It looks at
the same kinds of moral dilemmas, but from a different perspective.
The hedonistic argument is utilitarian in the sense that it turns on the
individual consequences -pleasure and pain-that flow from recogniz-
ing or failing to recognize religious freedom. The second value, on the
other hand, is nonconsequentialist: It says that there is something
wrong with forcing a conscientious religious claimant to violate a duty,
even if he is not primarily concerned about final rewards and punish-
ments. 83 The focus is not the claimant's own feelings, because these are
not the claimant's concern. He is instead preoccupied with the one, or
perhaps the many, to whom he owes a duty, and whom he must cheat,
fail, or disappoint in order to comply with the law. The individual
places great value in keeping faith with such duties, and it is this value
81. Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 803.
82. Id. at 804.
83. Chief Justice Hughes gave an eloquent statement of this position in his dissent in United
States v. Macintosh:
[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always
been maintained .... One cannot speak of religious liberty . . . without assuming the
existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God. . . . [F]redom of con-
science itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty.
283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). See also Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445
("Congressional reluctance to impose such a choice stems from . . . respect for the general pro-
position that fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the
demands of the secular state.").
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that religious liberty would protect.
This approach, like the last, avoids the difficulty of assuming that
religious claimants "choose" the commitments they are so reluctant to
violate. A duty is no less binding because it is "natural"-arising from
a relationship or situation that the individual did not voluntarily
enter-than it would be if it were freely assumed.
Here too, though, there is a problem explaining what makes reli-
gious duties special. It is a common observation that "persons who
avow religious beliefs. . . do not hold a monopoly on conscience."8' A
pacifist who believes that killing is absolutely wrong may act from a
conviction that he has a duty to his fellow man that is in no sense
religious. But it is difficult to show how such an obligation is any less
binding than the parallel claim of a Quaker whose duty has a religious
source.
Still another problem with the value of avoiding conflicting duties
is that it imperfectly describes the grounds for action posited by many
nontheistic religions. Consider again the ease of Steven Roy's daughter,
Little Bird of the Snow.85 Her claim to an exemption from the general
requirement that applicants for food stamps and AFDC must use a
social security number does not rest on a belief that doing so will
breach a duty owed to her gods. Instead it is a kind of self-regarding
concern dictated by a religious world view: that "the government's use
of [her] social security number. . . will 'rob [her] spirit.' ",0 That kind
of claim is entitled to consideration (even if not recognition) under the
free exercise clause. But the value of avoiding conflicting duties does
not account for it.
C. Avoiding Nullification and Civil Disobedience
I said earlier that the existence of the establishment clause makes
it difficult to argue for religious liberty on the basis of the social bene-
fits that accrue from protection of freedom. But I think there is one
kind of social interest the establishment clause permits us to recognize.
This is the interest in preventing the kinds of harm caused by the eight-
eenth amendment: 7 widespread disobedience; disproportionate invest-
84. M. KoNvrrz, REUGIOUS LtBRTY AND CONSCIENCE 99 (1968); see also M. WALzEV. Oa-
LIGATIONS 133 (1970); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L REv. 806, 813-16
(1958).
85. Roy, 590 F. Supp. 600.
86. Id. at 604.
87. The 18th amendment prohibited "the manufacture sale, or transportation or intoxicating
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ment of enforcement resources; and loss of respect for the law. It may
be that repression of religious behavior, like suppression of drink, is
unusually productive of these evils. If so, it is consistent with establish-
ment clause values to minimize the harm by taking a laissez-faire atti-
tude toward religious freedom.8 8 After all, the same arguments are
made for legalizing marijuana and prostitution, but the law would
hardly be said to canonize those activities by taking the arguments
seriously.
The value of avoiding civil disobedience is not without problems.
Ronald Dworkin would point out that the argument provides too little
protection because it builds on policy (social utility) rather than princi-
ple.89 If conflicting social goals loomed larger than the one I have men-
tioned, the right would go up in smoke. A second problem is the famil-
iar weakness shared by the first two values I discussed: What is so
special about religion that makes its repression unusually likely to pro-
duce the harms referred to? Mightn't we just as well add marijuana
and prostitution claims to the first amendment, if suppression of those
activities leads to the same kinds of problems?
There are no short answers to these objections. I think one can
make the case that there is something special about religion, and I will
take that matter up in the next section. By way of anticipation I will
say here that, when the law deals with religious claimants, it is address-
ing people who have a different understanding of reality than the one
on which society is built. That is not the case with either prostitutes or
marijuana smokers. It is not clear whether, as an empirical matter, the
religious claimant's view of reality is more productive of civil disobedi-
ence. But proof either way would be awfully difficult, and I think that
both common sense and the historical record would favor the proposi-
tion that it is.
If that is so (assume for the moment that it is), there is obvious
social utility in taking account of this phenomenon and its effects, even
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States. . . ." US. CONST. amend. XVIII, §1.
88. This attitude is like the policy that Justice White said was the basis for religious draft
exemptions:
[The exemption] may represent a purely practical judgment that religious objectors, how-
ever admirable, would be of no more use in combat than many others unqualified for
military service. Exemption was not extended to them to further religious belief or prac-
tice but to limit military service to those who were prepared to undertake the fighting
that the armed services have to do.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
89. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SEmIousLY 90-100, 266-72 (1977).
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if we don't do the same for nonreligious activities. In fact I think the
same point can be phrased (to pacify Professor Dworkin) in terms
stronger than utility. To the extent that religious nullification of the
law stems from a different perception of reality, one might say that
religious behavior is simply outside the law because the law is incapa-
ble of addressing it. In Hohfeldian terms the religious actor has an
"immunity" from legal control corresponding to the law's "disability"
to regulate.90
Let me give an example of what I mean. Suppose that the Amish
had lost in Wisconsin v. Yoder91 because the Supreme Court agreed
with the state that the utility of a few more years of education for
Amish children outweighed the disutility of the violations, enforcement
costs, and loss of respect for the law that would probably attend such a
decision.92 The matter would not end there. If the Amish were sincere
in their objection, one of several things might happen next. They might
move to another state. In that case Wisconsin would have accomplished
nothing in its role as parens patriae, and it might as well have left the
Amish alone. Alternatively, the Amish might stay in Wisconsin and
flout the Court's decision.93 Because they would have almost complete
control over the disutility of the government's conduct (violations, en-
forcements costs, disrespect), they could change the equation on which
the Court and the state relied, and a law based on utility would change
with it.
This is not a desirable way to resolve social conflicts. Yet it would
be inevitable without exemptions for religious objections, because the
law simply could not communicate its norms to people who have a dif-
ferent vision of reality. The most rational way for the legal system to
proceed in such cases, therefore, would be to avoid civil disobedience by
recognizing a religious exemption at the outset.
90. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied In Judicial Reasoning. 23
YALE LJ. 16, 55-58 (1913). See also Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 Nous 45.
50-51 (1970). Alternatively, one might say that the religious individual's objection is even more
fundamental than a rights-based objection, in the same way that a jurisdictional objection. FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). is more fundamental than a claim- or rights.based objection, FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
91. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
92. See id. at 219-25 for a summary of the state's argument. Dworkin would say, correctly,
that such a result might follow from the "weak" right hypothesized here.
93. Clyde Summers observed after the Second World War that "[w]hile we fought for free-
dom, one out of every six persons in the federal prisons was incarcerated for his religious convic-
tions." Summers, supra note 10, at 53.
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D. Is Religious Exercise Special?
Each of the suggestions I have made for values that might underlie
the free exercise clause-avoiding special suffering, avoiding conflicting
duties, avoiding nullification and civil disobedience-depends on the as-
sumption that there is something special about religion. Yet there are
many other activities that can make roughly similar claims for entitle-
ment to constitutional protection for those same reasons. In this section
I want to make one suggestion about why religious claimants might be
different from other people, and therefore deserving of special constitu-
tional protection.
To put it bluntly, I think religion is a lot like insanity. There are
two aspects to the parallel, just as there are two aspects to the most
commonly used test for insanity.9'4 The first is a cognitive aspect, which
concerns defects in practical reasoning; the second is a volitional as-
pect, which concerns the ability to conform one's conduct to legal
norms one knows to be binding.
First, as to the cognitive aspect. One can see several points of cor-
respondence by considering the old M'Naghten test.9 5 One part of that
test asked whether the actor, by reason of mental disease, did not know
the nature or quality of his act.9" The parallel problem of understand-
ing natural events in a way wholly at odds with the rest of society oc-
curs frequently in a religious context. Guy Ballard thought he com-
muned with Saint Germain and shook hands with Jesus. 7 He was not
exactly mainstream, but, as the Court pointed out, more orthodox be-
lievers are not all that different: "Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. . . . The mira-
cles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the
power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many."9' 8 On
occasion, the two problems-insane delusions and transcendent exper-
94. The Model Penal Code states the test thus: "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985).
95. According to the M'Naghten rule, a defendant is not criminally responsible if, at the time
of his act, he suffered from a mental disease which so affected his reason that he was either (I)
unaware of the nature and quality of his act or (2) unaware that his act was wrong. M'Naghten's
Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
96. The Model Penal Code gives as an example "[a] deranged person who believes he is
squeezing lemons when he chokes his wife." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment 2 (1985).
97. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
98. Id. at 86-87.
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iences-may even overlap. 9
More typical are problems concerning M'Naghten's second part,
the actor's inability to know that his act was wrong.100 Religious people
frequently make similar claims both in and outside the criminal con-
text. They assert that God requires what society deems wrong,101 or
more frequently, that God forbids what society permits or requires.0 2
Once again the problems of insanity and religion may overlap in cases
where an actor, "because of a delusion, believes that what he is doing is
morally right even though he knows it is criminal and condemned by
society."103 In jurisdictions that ask about the defendant's understand-
ing of wrongfulness (rather than criminality) such a belief will serve as
an excuse.
104
99. One might point, for example, to instances of witch murder, where the actor does not
believe that the victim is a human being. See, e.g., Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413 (1902);
Robilliard, Religion, Conscience and Law, 32 N. IRELAND LQ. 358. 367-368 (1981); Seidman.
Witch Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society under Radical Social Change. 28 MoD. L
REv. 46 (1965); Williams, Homicide and the Supernatural, 65 LQ. REv. 491 (1949). 1 should
add that in these cases the murderer is usually convicted and then let off by the Home Secretary.
100. "An extreme case is adduced by Sir FitzJames Stephen. of a mischievous lad who cut off
the head of a sleeping man to witness his suprise when he should wake." G. WILUAAS. CRIMINAL
LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 97 (1953). Lately we use the term "appreciate" rather than "know"
in order to emphasize that the knowledge must have sunk in. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 com-
ment 3 (1985).
101. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. 461 U.S. 574 (admission denied to applicants who advocated
or engaged in interracial dating or marriage); Heffron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Con-
sciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (distributing literature and soliciting donations in public places);
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (faith healing); Follett, 321 U.S. 573 (preaching the Gospel door-to-door):
Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (polygamy). The parallel to insanity is not exact, because the religious
claimant will almost always "know" in an intellectual sense that society frowns on the act, and
may even feel some compunction about violating the social norm. The latter, however, may not be
true of the claimant who is thoroughly convinced that his position is right. See Reynolds, 98 US.
at 162 (there may have been a "want of understanding on [the defendant's] part that he was
committing a crime" because he acted "under the influence of a religious belief that it was
right,-under an inspiration, if you please, that it was right").
102. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (payment of minimum wage to
rehabilitated addicts, derelicts, and criminals employed by the defendants as "associates"); Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (payment of social security tax on employees); Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (working in
weapons production); Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (display of motto "Live Free or Die" on license
plates); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (school attendance by Old Order Amish children beyond eighth
grade); Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (military service in unjust war); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (working on the Sabbath); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (saluting and pledging allegiance to
flag).
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment 5 (1985).
104. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United
States, 407 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1969) (overruled in part by United States v. Lyons. 731
F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 323 (1984)); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
606, 622 n.52 (2d Cir. 1966).
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The second, noncognitive aspect of the insanity test concerns
problems of volition. These are cases where the accused, "as a result of
mental disease or defect. . . lacks substantial capacity. . . to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law." 105 I am reminded, in thinking
of this aspect, of Martin Luther's response at the Diet of Worms:
"Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise,"10 6 or of St. Luke's gospel: "not
my will, [Lord,] but thine. 10 7 The thoroughly religious person may
hope to give up his own volition altogether in favor of following tran-
scendent directions.
Drawing conclusions from these parallels is risky for several rea-
sons. First, as to cognitive defects, one might object that belief in the
moral rightness of an act excuses criminal conduct only if one is also
insane.1 08 Such a belief won't work for someone whose only plea is reli-
gious constraint. More generally, one might argue that everyone differs
from the mean to some degree in matters of cognition and volition.
What sets the insane apart is that they differ so radically. But that does
not prove that religious claimants, like the insane and unlike others,
exceed the standard deviation (for example, that Goldman departs
more than the cowboy). Finally, any special treatment of "religious"
offenders in the criminal law might have something to do with the
objectives of the criminal law that do not carry over to more mundane
questions of civil liberties. Where retribution is not an issue, for exam-
ple, we may have fewer scruples about subjecting the religious claimant
to the same rules that apply to everyone else.
Nevertheless, I think it is possible to draw from these parallels a
hypothesis, if not a conclusion, about the special status of religion. Both
aspects of the insanity inquiry, cognition and volition, are concerned
with whether a person is capable of making a meaningful choice to
comply with the law. 19 The odd thing about religious claimants is that
their actions are controlled by factors that "cannot be verified to the
minds of those whose field of consciousness does not include religious
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985). This aspect of the test is abandoned in the In-
sanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 401-402, 98 Stat. 1837.
106. R. BAINTON. HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 185 (1950).
107. Luke 22:42.
108. This explains why the defendant usually loses in child-neglect cases involving refusal to
provide medical treatment. See, for example, the cases cited in Robilliard, supra note 99, at 360-
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insight."' 11° The rest of us can assess only one of the options (the "real"
one) presented by any choice, and cannot say how it stacks up against
the alternative. It may be that the two options are so incommensurable
that, for the claimant, there is no question of a choice. We protect their
freedom, then, because they are not free.
CONCLUSION
I hesitate to end with a "Conclusion" an essay that I envision as at
best a beginning. What I have tried to say is that we actors in the legal
system have up to now thought too little about why we attach to reli-
gion the importance it has. If the free exercise clause is something
more than an historical artifact, it must be because it protects some
values we esteem. But it is difficult to get everyone to agree on a set of
values that can be used to assess the strength of various religious
claims. There are a number of reasons for this. The clause protects an
infinite variety of acts; the acts may differ greatly in importance; and
according to current rules, the religious claimant himself decides how
important any particular act shall be.
The values we associate with other constitutional liberties also pro-
vide less guidance than one might hope. The establishment clause
makes it hard to rely on the kinds of consequentialist values that sup-
port freedom of speech. And the notion of individual autonomy, which
liberal theory holds in high esteem, works even less well in the context
of religion than it does for speech and substantive due process
freedoms.
I have suggested three values that may help to explain the impor-
tance of free exercise (though I confess that each of them is defective
in some ways, and that there are others I have ignored). One is avoid-
ing the special suffering endured by those forced to violate religious
norms. A second is avoiding the moral bind faced by religious claim-
ants torn between conflicting duties. The third is the consequentialist
value of preventing widespread disobedience, unusually large enforce-
ment costs, and loss of respect for the law.
The difficulty is that one can rely on these values to claim protec-
tion for at least some instances of nonreligious conduct that the Consti-
tution does not dignify in the way it does religion. If different treat-
ment is to be fair, one must be able to say that there is something
special about religious claims. I have suggested (though given my own
110. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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religious sensibilities, I hesitate to push the analogy too far) that in
their cognitive and volitional aspects religious claims are a lot like
claims of insanity-another case where we tolerate deviation from so-
cial and legal norms.
